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Abstract
We add the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist model to a modied version of the Smets-Wouters model
of the US in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. We then extract the models implied
residuals on US unltered data since 1984 to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. The main
banking shock tracks the unfolding sub-prime shock. This shock worsens the banking crisis but
traditional shocks explain the bulk of the crisis; the non-stationarity of the productivity shock
plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a runof bad shocks; based on this sample they occur
on average once every 40 years and when they occur around half are accompanied by nancial crisis.
Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises  provided the government
acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.
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1 Introduction
Since the banking crisis macroeconomic models have come under severe criticism, not merely in the
popular media but also among economists and policymakers, for failing to predict the crisis. While clearly
the models deny that it is possible to predict crises, so that this criticism is ill-founded, nevertheless the
majority did fail  much more seriously  to predict the possibility of crisis because they contain no
mechanisms that could produce it. They had no banking sector, so that a fortiori no banking crisis could
occur. Furthermore they embodied only stationary shocks so that permanent shocks to the level of trend
output, such as appear to characterise crisis episodes, were not examined; true, in the background there
was possibly a non-stationary trend in productivity (typically removed by ltering from the model data)
but there was not much focus on this in practice; Figure 1 illustrates. A further issue concerns their
ability to t the facts; economists such as Heckman have attacked the lack of empirical content in macro
models, implying that it is hardly surprising they could give little guidance to policy in the crisis.
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Figure 1: US real GDP and pre-crisis trend
In this paper we address these issues, building on recent work: we integrate a banking sector model
into a widely-used DSGE model; we re-estimate the model and test the model against the data; and
we apply it to unltered data so that nonstationary shocks are included. Finally we use it to give an
account of what produced this banking crisis and relate this nding to the current policy debate.
Since the crisis, much work has been done to incorporate a banking sector into DSGE models. The
banking models involve a friction in the intermediation process so that the interest margin required
reects the risk of loan default. This risk varies with the state of the economy. The exact transmission
between the state and the risk-premium di¤ers across the various banking models that have been proposed
but that of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) has been designed to capture many of the common
features of these models; it is their set-up that we therefore use here as a representative one. In it, the
IS curve now includes a variable risk-premium which is related to the economic state.
An important part of the explanation for crisis episodes lies in the permanence of crisis shocks;
thus after the Great Depression US output failed to catch up with its previous level for a decade, and
similarly after the oil crisis of the mid-1970s the level of output was permanently reduced so that initial
estimates of excess capacitybased on the previous output trend had to be revised downwards sharply.
In the latest Great Recession it appears that much the same is happening; for example excess capacity in
the UK is now o¢ cially estimated to be around 3%, whereas if the previous output trend level prevailed
it would be around 13%. Thus the trend level seems to take a permanent hit in these crisis episodes.
Furthermore the same appears to be true in reverse for periods of strong growth, such as the US in
the late 90s and early 2000s; the output trend in these periods gets shifted upwards permanently. This
suggests that the productivity and perhaps other shocks hitting the economy are non-stationary. Hence
here our aim is to model the economy under potentially nonstationary shocks.
As the banking crisis originated and was at its most damaging in the US, we focus our e¤orts on
models of the US economy. Our strategy is to take a well-known and empirically relatively successful
model of the US, that of Smets and Wouters (2007, SW), and add to it the banking model due to
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, BGG). Variants of the combination of SW and BGG have been
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used in recent papers by Christiano, Motto & Rostagno (2010) for the US and Eurozone separately;
Gilchrist et al. (2009) for the US alone and Fahr et al. (2011) for the Eurozone alone. They nd
that shocks that come from the nancial sector have an important role in explaining macroeconomic
uctuations. All these authors use the Bayesian approach to estimating the model parameters. Similar
ndings are reported by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
What distinguishes our work from these papers are the two main departures noted above. First,
we introduce non-stationary shocks, which we argue give us insight into the nature of crises. Second,
we estimate and test the overall models we use against the unltered data by indirect inference. If,
as we nd, the original (usually Bayesian) parameters do not pass the test, we search for parameters
that get closest to the data according to this test; and we only nally use a parameter set that passes
the test. As part of this empirical search we nd that a hybrid model works best, in which there are
both imperfectly (New Keynesian, NK) and perfectly competitive (New Classical) sectors in the labour
and product markets, with NK weights that turn out to be quite low  this builds on the work of Le
et al. (2011). We think this empirical hurdle is necessary in this particular area because while it is
possible to construct models that generate large nancial accelerator e¤ects by suitable choice of priors,
the parameter sets that pass this test of overall t to the data do not give anywhere near such large
e¤ects; it seems they cannot be found in the data.
One recent paper by Stock and Watson (2012) uses a dynamic factor model to show that the Great
Recession is explained by the same shocks that explained previous postwar recessions. They also show
that there has been a slowdown in underlying growth, and that the nancial shocks are important, but no
more important than before. So a new nancial crisis shock is not needed. Stock and Watsons ndings
are similar to what we will report in what follows.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin in section 2 by giving a brief account of the method of
indirect inference we use here. In section 3 we explain the modied SW model and the BGG banking
sector model. In section 4, we apply the model as re-estimated to the original unltered data and consider
what light it sheds on the causes of this banking crisis as well as of crises and banking crises in general.
Section 5 concludes and draws out some implications for policy.
2 The method of indirect inference
We evaluate the modelscapacity in tting the data using the method of indirect inference originally
proposed in Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2009) and subsequently with a number of renements
by Le et al. (2011) who evaluate the method using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach employs
an auxiliary model that is completely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of
the data against which the performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can
be summarised either by the estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we
will call these the descriptors of the data. While these are treated as the reality, the theoretical model
being evaluated is simulated to nd its implied values for them.
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Smith, 1993,
Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al., 1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova,
2005). Here we make a further use of indirect inference, to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated
structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series model. In estimation
the parameters of the structural model are chosen such that when this model is simulated it generates
estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual data. The optimal choices of
parameters for the structural model are those that minimise the distance between a given function of
the two sets of estimated coe¢ cients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the
actual coe¢ cients, the scores or the impulse response functions. In model evaluation the parameters of
the structural model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the performance of the auxiliary model
estimated on simulated data derived from the given estimates of a structural model  which is taken as
a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis  with the performance of the auxiliary model when
estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is correct then its predictions about the impulse
responses, moments and time series properties of the data should statistically match those based on the
actual data. The comparison is based on the distributions of the two sets of parameter estimates of the
auxiliary model, or of functions of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves rst constructing the errors implied by the previously esti-
mated/calibrated structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors and are backed
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out directly from the equations and the data1 . These errors are then bootstrapped and used to generate
for each bootstrap new data based on the structural model. An auxiliary time series model is then tted
to each set of data and the sampling distribution of the coe¢ cients of the auxiliary time series model is
obtained from these estimates of the auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether
functions of the parameters of the time series model estimated on the actual data lie in some condence
interval implied by this sampling distribution.
Following Meenagh et al. (2012) we use as the auxiliary model a VECM which we re-express as a
VAR(1) for the three macro variables (interest rate, output gap and ination) with the productivity
residual entered as an exogenous non-stationary process (this having the e¤ect of achieving cointegra-
tion2). Thus our auxiliary model in practice is given by: yt = [I K]yt 1+xt 1+gt+vt where xt 1 is
the stochastic trend in productivity, gt are the deterministic trends, and vt are the VECM innovations.
We treat as the descriptors of the data the VAR coe¢ cients (on the endogenous variables only, I  K)
and the VAR error variances (var[v]). The Wald statistic is computed from these3 . Thus e¤ectively we
are testing whether the observed dynamics and volatility of the chosen variables are explained by the
simulated joint distribution of these at a given condence level. The Wald statistic is given by:
(  )0
X 1
()
(  ) (1)
where  is the vector of VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with  andP
() representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated
across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the  is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and
the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribution4 . Such a distribution
is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it is also shown to be
consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statistic is asymptotically pivotal; they also showed
it had quite good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments5 .
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones
(H0, the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived,
the test then asks: could these coe¢ cients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model
generating the data? Of course only one true model with one set of coe¢ cients is possible. Nevertheless
we may have chosen coe¢ cients that are not exactly right numerically, so that the same model with
other coe¢ cient values could be correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coe¢ cient
values that are feasible within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason we later
extend our procedure by a further search algorithm, in which we seek other coe¢ cient sets that could
do better in the test.
Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each period using a powerful algorithm
based on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial
values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space6 . In e¤ect this is indirect
1Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here is the robust instrumental variables
estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data as instruments and
calculate the tted values from a VAR(1)  this also being the auxiliary model chosen in what follows.
2See Appendix 2.
3We do not attempt to match the time trends and the coe¢ cients on non-stationary trend productivity; we assume that
the model coe¢ cients yielding these balanced growth paths and e¤ects of trend productivity on the steady state are chosen
accurately. However, we are not interested for our exercise here in any e¤ects on the balanced growth path, as this is xed.
As for the e¤ects of productivity shocks on the steady state we assume that any inaccuracy in this will not importantly
a¤ect the business cycle analysis we are doing here  any inaccuracy would be important in assessing the e¤ect on the
steady state which is not our focus. Thus our assessment of the model is as if we were ltering the data into stationary
form by regressing it on the time trends and trend productivity.
4The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are
preserved.
5Specically, they found that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% condence level and 0.6%
at the 99% level. They suggested possible further renements in the bootstrapping procedure which could increase the
accuracy further; however, we do not feel it necessary to pursue these here.
6We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996). This mimics the behaviour of the steel cooling process
in which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the cooling process  this ensuring that
the defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in the chosen range and as points that improve the
objective are found it also accepts points that do not improve the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in
local minima. We nd this algorithm improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used
our standard testing method: we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals
from the data using the LIML method, nd their implied autoregressive coe¢ cients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the
implied innovations with this full set of parameters to nd the implied Wald value. This is then minimised by the SA
algorithm.
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inference estimation of the model; however here this estimation is being done to nd whether the model
can be rejected in itself and not for the sake of nding the most satisfactory estimates of the model
parameters. Nevertheless of course the method does this latter task as a by-product so that we can use
the resulting unrejected model as representing the best available estimated version. The merit of this
extended procedure is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when nally
doing our comparison of model compatibility with the data.
Before we proceed to carry out our tests and estimation, we should explain why we do not use the
much more familiar direct inference estimation and testing procedures here. In direct inference one
ts a structural model directly to the data, either by classical frequentistFIML or by the now popular
Bayesian ML. The likelihood that is maximised in FIML is derived from the size of the reduced form
errors. In Bayesian ML it is derived from this plus the priors  e¤ectively the resulting ML parameters
are a weighted average of the FIML values and the priors, where the weights depend on the prior
distributions and the extent to which the FIML values di¤er from the priors. The FIML values are
essentially those that give the best current forecasting performance for the model (i.e. minimising the
size of the reduced form errors). One can develop overall tests of the model specication under direct
inference by creating, in the FIML case, a Likelihood Ratio against some benchmark model, a natural
one being an unrestricted VAR; in the Bayesian case Del Negro and Schorfheide (2006) have proposed
the DSGE-VAR weight as a measure of model closeness to the data (this is the weight on the prior
models implied VAR, as combined with the unrestricted VAR, that maximises the likelihood). This can
also be treated as a specication test of the overall model, even though usually Bayesians are reluctant
to talk about testingthe model as whole.
Such tests are compared with the indirect inference tests using Monte Carlo experiments with an SW
model, in Le et al. (2012). They nd that the tests compare quite di¤erent features of model performance.
The direct ones check (in-sample) forecasting ability, while the indirect one checks the models causal
structure. For policy purposes we are most interested in using DSGE models for simulation of the e¤ects
of policy changes and hence in their causal structure. Typically forecasting is done by other means.
Both tests can still be used to test a models specication and hence its causal structure, even if the
direct method checks it via forecasting performance. But Le et al. also nd that, viewed as a test of model
specication, the power of direct inference tests in small samples is much lower than that of indirect
inference. In other words they discriminate rather weakly against false models. This is presumably
because forecasting is only weakly related to good specication; bad models with a lot of ad hoc lags
and added exogenous variables forecast better than models based on good theory, which are restricted
to having only structural shock processes as their exogenous variables. Furthermore false models will
generate false structural shock processes which may well partly compensate for the specication error in
the models forecasting performance. Meanwhile the indirect inference tests power against false models
allows one to discover rather accurately what features of the data behaviour a model can replicate and
what not; this in turn can be helpful in thinking about respecication.
In estimation both FIML and indirect estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. But as
we have seen the latters power is greater in small samples so that it should also give more reliable results
from estimation in small samples.
For these reasons we use the indirect inference procedure here both to estimate the model on our
available small samples and to test its specication.
3 The SW and BGG models
3.1 The SW model of the US economy
One of the main issues that emerged from the rst type of calibrated DSGE model, the real business cycle
(RBC) model, was its failure to capture the stylised features of the labour market observed in actual data.
Employment was found to be not nearly volatile enough in the RBC model compared with observed data,
and the correlation between real wages and output was found to be much too high (see, for example,
King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). The clear implication is that in the RBC model real wages are too
exible. The Smets-Wouters model (2007) marks a major development in macroeconometric modelling
based on DSGE models. Its main aim is to construct and estimate a DSGE model for the United States
in which prices and wages, and hence real wages, are sticky due to nominal and real frictions arising from
Calvo pricing in both the goods and labour markets, and to examine the consequent e¤ects of monetary
policy which is set through a Taylor rule. It may be said, therefore, to be a New Keynesian model. SW
combine both calibration and Bayesian estimation methods and use data for the period 1966Q12004Q4.
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Unusually, the SW model contains a full range of structural shocks. In the EU version  Smets
and Wouters (2003)  on which the US version is based, there are ten structural shocks. These are
reduced to seven in the US version: for total factor productivity, the risk premium, investment-specic
technology, the wage mark-up, the price mark-up, exogenous spending and monetary policy. These shocks
are generally assumed to have an autoregressive structure. The model nds that aggregate demand has
hump-shaped responses to nominal and real shocks. A second di¤erence from the EU version is that in
the US version the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the goods and labour markets is replaced by the aggregator
developed by Kimball (1995) where the demand elasticity of di¤erentiated goods and labour depends on
their relative price. A third di¤erence is that, in order to use the original data without having to detrend
them, the US model features a deterministic growth rate driven by labour-augmenting technological
progress.
Smets and Wouters made various tests of their model. Subsequently Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets
and Wouters (2007) further examined it by considering the extent to which its restrictions help to explain
the data. It should be noted that none of these exercises in evaluating the SW model were a test of
specication in the classical sense. Le et al. (2011) proposed such a test, a Wald test based on indirect
inference which compares the models VAR representation with the VAR coming from the data, and
showed that over the full post-war sample the original SW New Keynesian (NK) model was rejected. In
addition, they examined an alternative version in which prices and wages were fully exible but there
was a simple one-period information delay for labour suppliers. This New Classical (NC)version was
also rejected. They also proposed a hybrid model that merged the NK and NC models by assuming that
wage and price setters nd themselves supplying labour and intermediate output partly in a competitive
market with price/wage exibility, and partly in a market with imperfect competition. They assumed
that the size of each sector depended on the facts of competition and did not vary in the sample but
they allowed the degree of imperfect competition to di¤er between labour and product markets. The
basic idea was that economies consist of product sectors where rigidity prevails and others where prices
are exible, reecting the degree of competition in these sectors. Similarly with labour markets; some
are much more competitive than others. An economy may be more or less dominated by competition
and therefore more or less exible in its wage/price-setting. The price and wage setting equations in
the hybrid model are assumed to be a weighted average of the corresponding NK and NC equations. It
turned out that this combined model got much closer to the data for the full sample, when the rigidity
was quite limited.
Essentially, the NK model generated too little nominal variation while the NC model delivered too
much. However the hybrid model was able to reproduce the variances of the data; and it is this key
feature that enables it to match the data overall more closely. Nevertheless, it failed to match certain
features of the data, notably the behaviour of interest rates in relation to other major macro variables.
In view of this failure, it seemed that the problem could lie in the specication of monetary policy, and
in particular the use of one monetary regime for the whole sample from the 1950s to the 2000s. They
therefore tested for structural change during this period and duly found parameter breaks in two places:
1965 and 1984. These were natural places to nd such breaks because of changes that occurred in the
monetary regime. The earlier break is associated with the emergence of serious ination for the rst time;
the later break with the shift towards interest rate setting that followed from the adoption of (implicit)
ination targeting.
Le et al. (2011) found that for the third and last sub-period (1984Q32004Q2), a version of the model
very close to SWs original NK model was not rejected by the Wald test on the main macro variables
behaviour. Accordingly it is this version of the model on a sample from 1984 that we use here. Being
very close to the original version, with a high degree of nominal rigidity both in labour and product
markets, it behaves very like a standard New Keynesian model. In it, because capacity utilisation is
fairly exible, output is strongly a¤ected by shocks to demand and this in turn  via the Phillips Curve
 moves ination and then  via the Taylor Rule  interest rates. Supply shocks can a¤ect demand
directly (e.g. productivity shocks change the return on capital and so a¤ect investment) and also play a
role as cost-pushination shocks (e.g. price/wage mark-up shocks). Persistent shocks to demand raise
Tobins Q persistently and produce an investment boomwhich, via demand e¤ects, reinforces itself.
Thus the model acts as a multiplier/acceleratorof shocks both on the demand and the supply side.
3.2 The BGG model of the banking sector together with the SW model
The BGG nancial sector produces certain changes in the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) in the
form used here as modied by Le et al. (2011) but much remains unchanged.
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The household sector is unchanged. Households maximise a utility function by choosing goods and
labour over an innite life. They exhibit some consumption habit behaviour. A part of labour is
supplied to an imperfect labour market where households act as price-setters and the rest is supplied
to a perfectly competitive labour market. This results in a hybrid wage equation, where the aggregate
wage is the weighted average of wages obtained in the perfect and imperfect labour markets. Thus the
aggregate wage equation and consumption Euler equation remain unchanged.
In the government sector both monetary and scal policy also remain the same.
The BGG model incorporation divides the production side into three distinct participants: as pre-
viously, retailers and intermediate goods producers (now called entrepreneurs for a reason described
later) and in addition, capital producers. Retailers function in the same way as before, operating in
perfect competition to produce nal goods by aggregating di¤erentiated intermediate products using the
Dixit-Stiglitz technology. With the assumption that retail output is made up of a xed proportion of
intermediate goods in an imperfectly competitive market and intermediate goods sold competitively, the
aggregate price is a weighted average of prices received in the two types of market. As a result, the
aggregate price equation is unchanged. Capital producers operate in a competitive market and take
prices as given. They buy nal consumption goods and transform them into capital to be sold on to
entrepreneurs.
The di¤erence in BGG lies in the nature of entrepreneurs. They still produce intermediate goods, but
now they do not rent capital from households (who do not buy capital but only buy bonds or deposits)
but must buy it from capital producers and in order to buy this capital they have to borrow from a
bank which converts household savings into lending. On their production side, entrepreneurs face the
same situation as in Le et al. (2011). They hire labour from households for wages that are partly set in
monopolistic, partly in competitive labour markets; and they buy capital from capital producers at prices
of goods similarly set in a mixture of monopolistic and competitive goods markets. Thus the production
function, the labour demand and real marginal cost equations are unchanged. It is on their nancing
side that there are major changes. Entrepreneurs buy capital using their own net worth, pledged against
loans from the bank, which thus intermediates household savings deposited with it at the risk-free rate of
return. The net worth of entrepreneurs (nt) is kept below the demand for capital by a xed death rate of
these rms (1 ); the stock of rms is kept constant by an equal birth rate of new rms. Entrepreneurial
net worth therefore is given by the past net worth of surviving rms plus their total return on capital
(cyt) minus the expected return (which is paid out in borrowing costs to the bank) on the externally
nanced part of their capital stock  equivalent to
nt = nt 1 +
K
N
(cyt   Et 1cyt) + Et 1cyt + enwt (2)
where KN is the steady state ratio of capital expenditures to entrepreneurial net worth and  is the
survival rate of entrepreneurs. Those who die will consume their net worth, so that entrepreneurial
consumption (cet ) is equal to (1   ) times net worth. In logs this implies that this consumption varies
in proportion to net worth so that:
cet = nt (3)
In order to borrow, entrepreneurs have to sign a debt contract prior to the realisation of idiosyncratic
shocks on the return to capital: they choose their total capital and the associated borrowing before the
shock realisation. The optimal debt contract takes a state-contingent form to ensure that the expected
gross return on the banks lending is equal to the bank opportunity cost of lending. When the idiosyn-
cratic shock hits, there is a critical threshold for it such that for shock values above the threshold, the
entrepreneur repays the loan and keeps the surplus, while for values below it, he would default, with the
bank keeping whatever is available. From the rst order conditions of the optimal contract, the external
nance premium is equated with the expected marginal product of capital which under constant returns
to scale is exogenous to the individual rm (and given by the exogenous technology parameter); hence
the capital stock of each entrepreneur is proportional to his net worth, with this proportion increasing as
the expected marginal product rises, driving up the external nance premium. Thus the external nance
premium increases with the share of the rms capital investment that is nanced by borrowing:
Etcyt+1   (rt   Ett+1) =  (qqt + kt   nt) + eprt (4)
where the coe¢ cient  > 0 measures the elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage. Entre-
preneurs leverage up to the point where the expected return on capital equals the cost of borrowing from
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nancial intermediaries. The external nance premium also depends on an exogenous premium shock,
eprt. This can be thought of as a shock to the supply of credit: that is, a change in the e¢ ciency of the
nancial intermediation process, or a shock to the nancial sector that alters the premium beyond what
is dictated by the current economic and policy conditions.
Entrepreneurs buy capital at price qqt in period t and uses it in (t+ 1) production. At (t+ 1)
entrepreneurs receive the marginal product of capital rkt+1 and the ex-post aggregate return to capital
is cyt+1: The capital arbitrage equation (Tobins Q equation) becomes:
qqt =
1  
1   +RK
Etqqt+1 +
RK
1   +RK
Etrkt+1   Etcyt+1 (5)
The resulting investment by entrepreneurs is therefore reacting to a Q-ratio that includes the e¤ect of
the risk-premium. There are as before investment adjustment costs. Thus, the investment Euler equation
and capital accumulation equations are unchanged from Le et al. (2011). The output market-clearing
condition becomes:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
 ky
1   
 
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (6)
4 What does the model with nancial rigidity say about the
origins of the banking crisis?
4.1 Estimation and model t
The model that integrates the banking sector is estimated using the method of indirect inference as set
out in Le et al. (2011) for the 19842009 period. The estimated model is tested against the data using
the main macroeconomic variables, output, ination and the interest rate. We use a test of whether the
model can match the time series properties of the data jointly. The model is found to t the data well
with a Wald t-statistic of 1:56. The estimated parameters can be found in Table 1. Impulse response
functions to key variables when the model is applied to non-stationary data are shown in Figure 2. Note
that the second set of IRFs in Figure 2 are due to a non-stationary productivity shock. Figure 3 shows
that the model generates 95% condence intervals for the implied VAR responses that encompass or
come close to encompassing the data-based VAR responses for a monetary shock; these VAR responses
(the rest are shown in Appendix 3) are jointly encompassed by the model so that individual ones may
lie slightly outside.
The estimated coe¢ cients are substantially di¤erent from the starting set for which we used Smets
and Wouters (2007) Bayesian estimated parameters of the non-banking model and the original BGG
calibrated parameters for the two banking equations and low NK weights reecting the initial ndings of
Le et al. (2011)7 . One can think of the latest set of non-banking parameters along a spectrum between
a fully New Keynesian and a fully New Classical model. Overall the model is fairly New Classical
with NK weights of 0.56 in the labour market and 0.09 in the goods market. However, this is partly
counterbalanced by a greater rigidity of wages and prices and more wage indexation in the NK sector
than in the starting values, and by greater elasticities of labour supply and capacity utilisation, as well
as lower capital adjustment cost, all of which raise output responses to shocks. Taylor Rule responses
are also all smaller so again implying less dampening of output responses. In the banking equations the
main change is a more than halving of the response of the spread to net worth and the return on capital.
This underlines the point that the data in general do not support large nancial transmission e¤ects, a
factor we revert to below that partly explains why our paper nds a much smaller role than others do
for nancial shocks.
7We use these instead of the post 1984 re-estimated weights because the crisis period injects turbulence into the Great
Moderation period, more like the original full sample.
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Model Coe¢ cients: 1984Q3-2009Q2
Starting coef Estimated coef
Steady-state elasticity of capital adjustment ' 5:74 7:5744
Elasticity of consumption c 1:38 1:2716
External habit formation  0:71 0:6512
Probability of not changing wages w 0:70 0:7533
Elasticity of labour supply L 1:83 2:8327
Probability of not changing prices p 0:66 0:8398
Wage indexation w 0:58 0:9404
Price indexation p 0:24 0:1213
Elasticity of capital utilisation  0:54 0:1988
Share of xed costs in production (+1)  1:50 1:6841
Taylor Rule response to ination rp 2:50 1:8886
Interest rate smoothing  0:60 0:7742
Taylor Rule response to output ry 0:08 0:0381
Taylor Rule response to change in output ry 0:22 0:1133
Share of capital in production  0:19 0:1435
Proportion of sticky wages !w 0:40 0:5624
Proportion of sticky prices !r 0:10 0:0874
Elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage  0:04 0:0279
Quarterly steady-state inationy  0:78 0:7800
Discount factory  0:9984 0:9984
Steady-state hours workedy L 0:53 0:5300
Quarterly steady-state output growthy  0:43 0:4300
WALD (Y; ;R) 104:0786 21:5148
T-stat 9:1080 1:5560
yFixed parameter
Table 1: Coe¢ cient Estimates (1984Q3-2009Q2)
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Figure 2: IRFs for key variables
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Figure 3: VAR IRFs for a monetary shock
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4.2 Error properties on unltered data
Having established that the model that integrates the banking sector ts the data, we now go on to
apply it to the recent crisis episode in the US. To do this we extract the model errors from the unltered
data (shown in Figure 4) and t to each an AR time-series process over the period. Table 2 shows the
status of each error and also the AR parameters estimated by our procedure. We nd that productivity
unambiguously has a unit root. The external premium, government and labour supply shocks are all
ambivalent; their ADF statistics do not reject non-stationarity, while their KPSS statistics do not reject
stationarity. All are heavily a¤ected by recent observations, mainly the crisis period, and the theory is
clear that they should be stationary; thus government spending would be limited by some limit on tax
rates and both the labour supply and the premium by the ending of the crisis. We have accordingly
treated them as either stationary or trend-stationary. For the AR coe¢ cient we take the estimated value;
where this is unity, we set it just below, so that while technically stationary it is very highly persistent
over the crisis period. The other shocks are all clearly either stationary or trend-stationary.
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Figure 4: Equation Errors from 1984-2009.
ADF KPSS Conclusion Coe¢ cient
p-value+ statistic AR Prod. shock
Government Spending 0:3946 0:2707 Stationary 0:8803 0:1931
Consumer Preference 0:0000 0:1290 Stationary 0:0346
Investment 0:0000 0:0468 Stationary 0:3165
Taylor Rule 0:0000 0:0919 Trend Stat. 0:3971
Productivity 1:0000 1:2796 Nonstat. 0:2547
Price Mark-up 0:0000 0:2025 Stationary 0:0550
Wage Mark-up 0:0000 0:1302 Stationary 0:0078
Labour Supply 0:6096 0:2884 Trend Stat. 0:9990
Premium 0:0631 0:0641 Trend Stat. 0:9990
Net Worth 0:0000 0:1450 Stationary 0:0656
+ p-value of 0.05 is the 5% condence limit for rejecting the unit root.
() KPSS rejects stationarity at 5%(1%).
Table 2: Stationarity of Shocks and AR Parameters(1984Q3-2009Q2)
Plainly the crisis had international ramications but we cannot identify the causality of these in a US-
only model. The shocks that show up in the model are partly coming from these international e¤ects;
most obviously commodity price shocks that enter through the price mark-up here are themselves
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responding to the US crisis. A further, similar limitation of our account is our inability to analyse
connections between the shocks to the model. No doubt the banking shocks we identify had simultaneous
and lagged e¤ects on the non-banking shocks; but also vice versa, the non-banking on the banking. The
sample episode is too short to establish which way such e¤ects might go or even if they exist, tempting as
it might be to run some regressions to detect them. The model assumes that each shock is separate from
the others and only related to its own past. The model then disentangles how each shock works through
the economy to a¤ect nal outcomes. Anyone that wished to take matters further would have to model
the interactions of the shocks themselves through a wider model, such as one of political economy.
4.3 The errors driving the episode
We begin by showing the behaviour of the main model errors (i.e. the total accumulated innovations)
during the crisis episode, which we treat as 2006Q1 to 2009Q2. These are shown in Figure 5. We have
not included the recovery periodat this stage, though this would be interesting; our focus is on the
period when the economy rst went into recession and then bottomed out.
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Figure 5: Accumulated Shocks from 2006Q12009Q2
We can immediately single out from these errors four key ones which behaved in a particularly
persistent way during the crisis period: productivity (as we would expect), the Taylor Rule, labour
supply and the External Finance Premium. These four turn out to have been the main drivers of the
economy during this episode.
Productivity grew powerfully in the early stages of the period but stalled and fell in the heart of the
crisis.
The Taylor Rule error forced up the interest rate steadily against the Rules dictates: this was the
operation of the zero bound.
Labour supply refers to the competitive sector wage equation which su¤ered from upward wage
push(equivalently a fall in labour supply) throughout the period until the heart of the crisis when it
was partially reversed, presumably by the extreme labour market conditions. According to the model
this error is the product of real wage push. This may have resulted from the remarkable rise in oil
and commodity prices over this period, which sharply reduced real wages; seen as abnormal it may have
caused a reduction of labour supply (a real wage resistance) through intertemporal substitution. It could
also be that the collapse of employment, particularly in construction, led to the redundancy of unskilled
and (through FIFO) younger workers in the main; the fact that older and skilled workers were more
likely to be kept on may thus have raised the average wage bill, even while productivity soared. This
would suggest we should link the productivity and wage push errors. There is no obvious other cause:
the policies of the Obama administration (on union power and Obamacare) only came in for the last
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two quarters of our period when wage push fell back. As this was the competitive sector it should not
have been wage stickiness; indeed the fact that it accumulated and only went into reverse after 3 years
suggests it cannot have been.
Finally, the error in the External Finance Premium equation is large, rising and persistent, only easing
o¤ slightly just before the end of the episode. What this reveals is that, even when a banking sector is
included in the model, it cannot account for the behaviour of the Premium. There is a large additional
and cumulative shock at work, specic to the episode. This error can be thought of as reecting the
fear of a run on the banks, emanating from the specic circumstances a¤ecting banks in the crisis: the
sub-prime write-o¤, the Lehman collapse and so on.
It is worth dwelling on the possible sources of this shock, which we will call the Sub-Primeshock
since plainly it is associated with the way large amounts of sub-prime mortgage debt were rst bundled
up as securities, then sliced up by risk statusand repackaged as non-transparent Collateralised Debt
Obligations, then resold around the world to credulous banks mostly in Europe, to be held in unknown
quantities on these banksbalance sheets, creating huge uncertainty about which banks were at risk 
as in the card game, which turns on who will wind up holding the Queen of Spades.
The Sub-Prime shock reached its peak after the collapse of Lehman. After this governments all
over the world, including the US, were forced to bail out their insolvent banks and the size of the
shock eventually diminished (after our sample ends) as this government backing allayed concerns over
the remaining banksviability. Thus the shock we nd here seems to be associated with government
intervention both in its initial propagation and in its cleaning-up afterwards.
4.4 A stochastic variance decomposition of the episode
We next look at the variance decomposition of such episodes. Again, we are using unltered data when
performing this analysis which treats the episode stochastically  that is, we take the shocks in the
episode and replay them by redrawing them randomly and repeatedly with replacement to see what a
typical crisis episode would be like. Our variance decomposition is therefore for such a typical episode.
Int. rate Inv. Inf. Real Wages Cons. Output Emp.
Government
Spending
2:8 0:0 0:6 1:0 0:3 1:4 1:1
Preferences 3:5 0:0 1:2 13:1 2:2 2:7 0:9
Investment 2:6 2:1 1:0 2:2 0:3 1:1 0:7
Taylor Rule 4:1 0:2 6:7 9:5 0:8 1:8 0:8
Productivity 6:5 0:5 17:1 19:3 27:6 29:5 11:3
Price
Mark-up
5:2 0:1 22:5 7:8 0:4 1:0 0:4
Wage
Mark-up
0:0 0:0 0:0 0:4 0:0 0:0 0:0
Labour
Supply
20:9 1:5 37:3 43:4 56:6 54:0 77:4
Premium 45:9 83:6 11:4 3:1 9:8 6:9 6:0
Net Worth 8:5 12:0 2:2 0:2 2:1 1:6 1:5
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Banking
Shocks
54:3 95:6 13:6 3:3 11:9 8:5 7:4
Non-Banking
Shocks
45:7 4:4 86:4 96:7 88:1 91:5 92:6
Table 3: Variance Decomposition for Crisis Period
What we see from Table 3 is that only 9% of the output variance is due to nancial shocks; and the
rest is due to the usual non-banking shocks. For investment the share of nancial shocks is very high
(96%); but this gets dampened in its e¤ect on GDP partly because interest rates react to them and
partly because it is a small part of GDP. Accordingly we see that interest rates are also highly a¤ected
(54%) by the nancial shocks. As for ination only 14% comes from this nancial side.
What we see here is that there was a distinct role for nancial shocks (essentially the Sub-Prime
shock) in such episodes. However, the bulk of the variation comes from the other shocks: labour supply
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and productivity, plus for ination the price mark-up. We can think of the crisis as being the result
mainly of normal poor macro shocks (slowing of productivity growth, wage push, oil shock) with the
Sub-Prime shock adding a nasty extra twist (about 1% extra o¤ GDP at the bottom of the recession in
real time as we will see in the next section). Thus turning it from a nasty (moderate crisis) episode into
a Great Recessionepisode.
The failure of scal policy to show up through the government spending e¤ect is not really surprising:
the scal response largely took the form of transfers, such as nancial bail-outs (of AIG, Fannie and
Freddie) and cash for clunkers. Such transfers have no identiable e¤ect within this model; but one
can think of them as already embodied in the Sub-Prime shock as a mitigating response, as discussed
above; since clearly the risk premium and net worth shocks would have been much worse without this
government cash infusion, which is acting like a supply of credit to both the cash-starved banks and the
private sector. Thus these direct banking shocks are recorded net of this public response; unfortunately
we have no way of disentangling the total banking shock from the mitigating e¤ect of such government
direct intervention in the nancial system. We suggested above that the peaking of the Sub-Prime shock
after Lehman was due to the government intervention. We could use this possibly as an identifying
device for that part of the shock due to scal intervention; however we have not done so here as there
are only three observations after Lehman.
What we have found here is in contrast to ndings in the recent literature, where it has been found
that the nancial shocks are very important. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) examine the e¤ects of
nancial shocks on linear detrended US data for the 19842010 period. They nd that nancial shocks
contribute to almost half of the volatility of output and the productivity shock only contributes to 4:1%
of output volatility. Christiano et al. (2010) augment a standard monetary DSGE model to include
nancial frictions for the US and EU using detrended data from 1985   2008. They nd that nancial
friction shocks account for a substantial portion of economic uctuations. The main reason that we nd
that the productivity shock plays such an important role is that we have used non-stationary data for
our analysis. This gives us a non-stationary productivity shock, so that any change in productivity is
permanent. Another reason is that we are using a model that is fully estimated to conform to the data
behaviour as much as possible.
We show in Table 4 how the variance decompositions in our model would di¤er if a) if we used the
original SWBGG model with stationary data b) we used stationary data with our existing model. If we
go back to SWBGGs original coe¢ cients and stationary data, the share of banking shocks in output
variance rises to 79.5%, much in line with the results of other authors. If we replace these coe¢ cients by
the ones we have estimated here, the share drops to 52.3%, illustrating the way in which parameters that
can replicate the samples data behaviour give smaller e¤ects of nancial transmission. Finally, once we
then include nonstationary shocks, the share drops sharply to the one we report of 8.5%.
We also estimate and test our model against the data using indirect inference, which is a strict test
of whether the model can match the time series properties of the data. The authors above generally use
either calibrated parameters or estimate them using Bayesian maximum likelihood; we have found that
such estimates can lie a fair way away from parameters exibly reestimated as here and are generally
rejected by our tests. Thus it may well be that a further contributing factor to the di¤erence in our
results lies in the closeness of our parameters to the data. In particular, as noted at the start, the e¤ects
of nancial frictions appear to be much smaller in the data than in some calibrated models.
4.5 Accounting for this particular banking crisis episode
We can also decompose what actually happened in the precise episode that occurred according to the
model as a result of these shocks. We do this in the charts that follow for the main macro variables.
If we focus rst on output (Figure 6), we see that the Sub-Prime shock contributes about 1% to
the downturn by 2009Q2, the bottom of the recession. The main other negative element is the labour
supply shock. The Taylor Rule and investment shocks tip output down further. However, what stops
the downturn from turning into a rout is a strong positive productivity shock  the overall swing from
peak to trough is just under 6%.
We show three lines on the chart: the total predicted, the predicted total without nancial shocks,
and the total predicted without either nancial shocks or any nancial transmission. The last two
hardly di¤er, showing that nancial transmission of non-nancial shocks is modest: the e¤ect of the
non-nancial shocks is occurring through the usual non-nancial channels. The nancial e¤ect is coming
from the nancial shocks themselves.
If we turn to interest rates (Figure 7), we see in the nal 2 quarters, 2009Q1 and 2009Q2, how the
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Output
Stationary data
Original coe¤s
Stationary data
II estimated coe¤s
Unltered data
II estimated coe¤s
Government
Spending
0:4 1:8 1:4
Preferences 2:3 18:2 2:7
Investment 1:8 6:4 1:1
Taylor Rule 1:0 5:1 1:8
Productivity 13:7 4:3 29:5
Price
Mark-up
0:2 0:4 1:0
Wage
Mark-up
1:0 0:0 0:0
Labour
Supply
0:0 11:4 54:0
Premium 5:2 5:1 6:9
Net Worth 74:3 47:2 1:6
TOTAL 100 100 100
Banking
Shocks
79:5 52:3 8:5
Non-Banking
Shocks
20:5 47:7 91:5
Table 4: Comparison of Output Variance Decompositions for Crisis Period
productivity and Sub-Prime shocks were pulling rates down, but this was o¤set to some extent by the
Taylor Rule policy shocks which moved from negative in the second half of 2008 to positive in the rst
half of 2009, reecting the e¤ect of the zero bound: policymakers would have liked to ease by another
0.6% per annum.
Finally on ination (Figure 8), we see how the price mark-up shock has both negative and positive
e¤ects during the episode as oil and commodity prices rst surged, and later fell back sharply as the
recession took hold at the end of 2008  see Figure 9. The labour supply and productivity shocks
largely o¤set each other, implying that ination remained surprisingly stable during the episode; by
the end the Taylor Rule, investment and Sub-Prime shocks were driving ination down, close to the
deationary range (below -0.5% means that if ination had otherwise been at a 2% target, it would have
gone negative for the quarter.)
The overall interpretation coming from this analysis is of a crisis triggered by severe exogenous shocks,
and exacerbated by a large nancial shock, itself o¤set by large scal intervention. The zero bound added
some further pressure. This cannot be described as a crisis created by the nancial system.
4.6 What is and causes a (nancial) crisis?
If we take a longer perspective than just this crisis, we can ask: what is a crisis and what causes it,
according to our analysis of this US sample? Let us dene a crisisas a severe downturn in output, a
large part of which is permanent; and a nancial crisis as a crisis in which there is also a nancial collapse
of some sort. What does this model have to say in general about the causes of these? We examine this
question by inspecting the bootstrap experience (potential scenarios over the period) from the model
and its normal shocks; for this we use the shocks from the period 1984   2007 so that we do not reuse
the shocks from this crisis period itself. Again, this analysis is done on unltered data. Plainly we know
that these shocks generate crisis; and we want to discover whether this experience is unique.
We nd the following regularities:
a) Crisis is a normal part of capitalism: this economy will generate crises regularly from standard
shock sequences. We illustrate this from some of the bootstrap simulations/scenarios produced from the
shocks of the 1984   2007 period (i.e. sans crisis) in Figures 10 and 11. In around half of them there
were quite serious interruptions of activity, which satisfy the denition of crisis. If we dene a crisis as
a fall in GDP of at least 1% with at least 5 years, before output returns to its previous peak, then we
nd that a crisis on average will occur about every 67 years.
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Figure 6: Shock Decomposition for Output During the Banking Crisis Episode
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Figure 7: Shock Decomposition for Interest Rate During the Banking Crisis Episode
We also ran the scenarios with the full set of shocks including the crisis period, 1984   2009; this
not surprisingly produced a somewhat greater average frequency, of one about every 61 years. Since the
main shock specic to the crisis period of 2006   9 is the Sub-Prime shock, one can think of this extra
frequency as the result of this shock being included.
If one denes a Great Depression as a fall in GDP of 5% or more lasting for 5 years or more (before
GDP returns to its previous level) then they occur on average once every 200 years if we use the sample
without crisis shocks and the frequency rises to 121 years if the crisis shocks are included.
Plainly these gures are a¤ected by the nature of the sample shocks; here we have used the experience
of the last three decades, which apart from the crisis itself was the period of the Great Moderation. As we
know that the variance of shocks in this period was markedly lower than in earlier post-war US history,
extending our sample backwards in time would no doubt change our estimates in detail. However, the
last three decades seems the most relevant experience for todays policymakers.
b) When there is crisis, there is also a nancial crisis about a tenth of the time, when one uses the
shocks for the non-crisis period. We measure this here by the appearance of an abnormal premium rise
accompanying a crisis fall in output. This is shown for the same scenarios by showing the corresponding
external premium behaviour.
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Figure 8: Shock Decomposition for Ination Rate During the Banking Crisis Episode
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Figure 10: Crises Not Accompanied by Financial Crisis
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Figure 11: Crises Accompanied by Financial Crisis
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c) An extreme nancial shock is not required to produce a nancial crisis. This is evident from the
charts above since the nancial shocks from 1984   2007 used for these simulations were none of them
extreme and yet we clearly got several nancial crises. Figure 12 shows the premium shock during this
sample period, the only nancial shock that contributed to the crisis; as can be seen it varies on a small
scale, compared with its severity over the crisis (to the right of the red line).
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Figure 12: Premium Shock for the 84-09 Period
d) A nancial shock is not su¢ cient to produce a crisis, even though it produces a rise in the premium.
To check this point we redid these scenarios with just the two nancial shocks including the crisis period
values; thus this shock series includes both normal and extreme nancial shocks. If nancial crisis can be
the result of extreme nancial shocks, we should obtain a few at least. However we obtained absolutely no
crises at all. What we see from the three simulations in Figure 13 is that even though our nancial shock
series is e¤ectively non-stationary it does not cause a crisis; all it does is cause run-ups in the nancial
premium, but these do not count as nancial crises if there is no accompanying crisis (i.e. there is a
partially-permanent downturn in output). Here we should emphasise that the extreme nancial shocks
in the sample included the e¤ects of massive government intervention, which occurred largely because of
the experience of the Great Depression when there was no such intervention; thus this particular nding
relies crucially on the assumption that nancial shocks are accompanied by vigorous lender-of-last-resort
activity by governments.
5 Conclusions
We have taken the Smets-Wouters model of the US, derived from Christiano et al. (2005), but here in
the form as modied by Le et al.(2011) to allow for more heterogeneity in price/wage behaviour, and
we have integrated into it the banking/nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) in order to
discover how far the banking crisis might have been caused by non-banking and by banking shocks. We
began by estimating the model to get it as close as possible to the data on the indirect inference test we
are using.
We then used the model with its re-estimated parameters to carry out an accounting exercise in the
shocks causing the crisis episode. This was done on unltered data, allowing for non-stationary shocks.
We did a variance decomposition to establish what a typical crisis generated by these shocks if redrawn
randomly would be caused by. We then looked at the decomposition for this particular episode. Finally
we ran a variety of simulations bootstrapped from di¤erent sets of the shocks in our sample (over the
last three decades, on the grounds that this is of most relevance today) to shed light on the causes of
crisis and banking crisis.
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Figure 13: Simulation with only Financial Shocks
Our conclusion is perhaps rather startling: the banking crisis was mainly the result of non-banking
shocks impacting through the usual non-nancial channels on the US economy. The main non-bank
shocks to output were from productivity (largely positive) and labour supply (negative from wage
push). Monetary policy shocks, apparently related to the zero bound problem, also contributed. The
banking shock was a specic result of the Sub-Prime process; it contributed a further 1% drop in output;
however, government direct scal action through transfers was designed to alleviate this shock.
We interpret these results as telling us that the banking system is integral to the functioning of
the capitalist economy but that it is essentially responsive to the economy; nor does its transmission
mechanism worsen economic instability. The sources of boom and slump remain those identied in
non-banking models: shocks to productivity, including importantly those coming from the commodity
sector, and to some extent shocks to the household sector mainly via labour supply. However we have
also identied an independent shock to the banking sector, the Sub-Prime shock. This did not emerge
from normal banking behaviour, as is made clear by its status as a pure shock. It was alleviated by
government scal intervention; this was clearly an important element in this nancial crisis.
The model also tells us that crises are regular occurrences in capitalist economies and that they
frequently have as their by-product nancial crisis in the sense that the premium rises sharply  a
similar nding that the recent Great Recession was a product of the same shocks, including nancial,
that occurred earlier during the post-war period, but on this occasion unusually large, is made by Stock
and Watson (2012) using a dynamic factor VAR. These crises/nancial crises occur in spite of there
being no extreme nancial shocks such as occurred in the recent episode; so serious nancial shocks
are not required for crises to happen. Furthermore, extreme nancial shocks on their own of the type
identied in this sample do not cause crises; all they do is cause temporary recessions. Thus both crises
and nancial crises result from non-nancial shocks; nancial shocks if extreme enough will add an extra
layer of recession. Again, we must stress the caveat that the nancial shocks identied in this sample all
occurred in a political environment where the government acted as lender of last resort; absent this, the
scale of these shocks would have been no doubt very di¤erent.
Is there then a role for regulation of bank behaviour in such a system? Plainly regulation could not
have stopped this bank crisis since it was not caused by bank behaviour. In some countries other than
the US (e.g. Spain and Australia) banks were prevented from buying sub-prime CDOs by central banks
that did not permit the special vehiclesthrough which these were usually held. In the US the crisis
could have been prevented by limits on sub-prime loans in place of the encouragement that seems to
have been given to them by Washington. The experience of other countries suggests that their regulators
should have stopped the CDOs based on them being passed across the Atlantic so easily or else that
other measures, such as creating far greater transparency in instruments such as these CDOs, should
have been adopted. This points to a regulative system that puts backstop prudential limits in place.
None of this has much to do with the currently proposed regulation of the banking system in the US
20
and elsewhere. For example the Dodd-Frank legislation, which seems motivated by the aim of stopping
future crises, represents a huge intervention in banking activity, that seems likely to badly distort and
even stie the bank transmission mechanism.
As far as scal and monetary policy go, we have found in common with many others that the zero
bound is a problem, though its quantitative e¤ect in this episode seems to have been small. We have
also found that public spending shocks have had little e¤ect. However scal policy mainly operated in
this episode via large transfers to the banking and non-bank business sector; these transfers are wrapped
up in the banking shockssince they impacted directly on the credit risk-premium. Fiscal policy was
e¤ectively policy for credit supply from the taxpayer (as was Quantitative Easing which started in 2008
Q4); it appears that this scal policy was e¤ective, if we compare the episode with the Great Depression
where its absence seems to have led to a much larger shock.
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Appendix 1: Model Listing
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Wage Setting equation
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Labour demand
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Market Clearing condition in goods market
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Aggregate Production equation
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Taylor Rule
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Premium
Etcyt+1   (rt   Etpt+1) =  (qqt + kt   nt) + eprt (17)
Net worth
nt =
K
N
(cyt   Et 1cyt) + Et 1cyt + nt 1 + enwt (18)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (19)
Appendix 2: Using the VECM as the auxiliary model
After log-linearisation a DSGE model can usually be written in the form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (A1)
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables which we assume are driven by
xt = a(L)xt 1 + d+ c(L)t: (A2)
The exogenous variables may contain both observable and unobservable variables such as a technology
shock. The disturbances et and t are both iid variables with zero means. It follows that both yt and
xt are non-stationary. L denotes the lag operator zt s = Lszt and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial
functions with roots outside the unit circle.
The general solution of yt is
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t: (A3)
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt and xt are non-stationary, the
solution has the p cointegration relations
yt = [I  G(1)] 1[H(1)xt + f ]
= xt + g: (A4)
The long-run solution to the model is
yt = xt + g
xt = [1  a(1)] 1[dt+ c(1)t]
t = 
t 1
i=0t s
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt = xDt + x
S
t has a deterministic trend x
D
t = [1  a(1)] 1dt
and a stochastic trend xSt = [1  a(1)] 1c(1)t.
The solution for yt can therefore be re-written as the VECM
yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t
=  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f + !t (A5)
!t = M(L)et +N(L)t
Hence, in general, the disturbance !t is a mixed moving average process. This suggests that the VECM
can be approximated by the VARX
yt = K(yt 1  xt 1) +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + g + t (A6)
where t is an iid zero-mean process.
As
xt = xt 1 + [1  a(1)] 1[d+ t]
the VECM can also be written as
yt = K[(yt 1   yt 1) (xt 1   xt 1)] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + h+ t: (A7)
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Either equations (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliary model. Here we focus on (A7); this distinguishes
between the e¤ect of the trend element in x and the temporary deviation from its trend. In our models
these two elements have di¤erent e¤ects and so should be distinguished in the data to allow the greatest
test discrimination.
It is possible to estimate (A7) in one stage by OLS. Meenagh et al. (2012) do Monte Carlo experiments
to check this procedure and nd it to be extremely accurate.
Appendix 3: VAR IRFs
In this appendix we show how the model, given that it jointly predicts (within 95% bounds) the VAR
coe¢ cients that determine the IRFs of shocks on the three key macro variables, thereby also broadly
predicts these IRFs. Because the Wald test is of the joint behaviour of the VAR coe¢ cients and on the
variances of the three variable residuals, there is not a perfect correspondence with the individual IRFs.
However, it can be seen, as expected, that most of the IRFs lie mostly within the bounds.
It is the IRFs that policymakers are interested in, as pointed out by Christiano et al. (2005). They
need to be assured that empirically the IRFs the model implies should appear in the data actually do so
within statistical bounds (of course the IRFs implied for data behaviour reect both the model structural
IRFs and sample shock variations). Then they feel able to use the models (structural) IRFs to determine
the e¤ect of shocks and of policies to o¤set shocks.
The VAR innovations are identied throughout by the model; we have no independent way of iden-
tifying the VAR innovations (any such ways suggested are based on some non-controversial model
restrictions; however, the model here is non-controversial in its current innovation structure and so we
use it.) The testing kicks in on the variances of the VAR innovations and on the lagged e¤ects of each
variable (the VAR coe¢ cients).
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Figure 14: VAR IRFs for an exogenous demand shock
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Figure 15: VAR IRFs for a consumer preference shock
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Figure 16: VAR IRFs for an investment shock
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Figure 17: VAR IRFs for a monetary shock
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Figure 18: VAR IRFs for a productivity shock
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Figure 19: VAR IRFs for a price mark-up shock
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Figure 20: VAR IRFs for a wage mark-up shock
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Figure 21: VAR IRFs for a labour supply shock
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Figure 22: VAR IRFs for a premium shock
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Figure 23: VAR IRFs for a net worth shock
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